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Freedom in the Free World: The Extimate Becomes The Law 
 
1. Epigones in America 
 
In a well-known and oft-repeated anecdote relating Freud’s arrival to the United States in 
1909 with his then friend and colleague Carl Jung, Freud supposedly remarked that the warm 
reception they were being greeted with by their hosts on the other side of the Atlantic was 
premised on a fundamental misunderstanding: ‘They don’t understand’, Freud supposedly said, 
‘that we are bringing them the plague.’ Whether this conversation took place or not is immaterial. 
Its repeated circulation, the circulation of the signifier, as Lacan would emphasize later, is what 
matters: the signifier takes a life of its own and determines meaning, the same meaning that Freud 
so presciently suggested was destined to misunderstanding.  It is this misunderstanding that Lacan 
insisted is at the heart of all human communication: we delude ourselves into thinking we 
understand each other, but the most we can hope for is a successful, and hopefully bloodless, 
misunderstanding.  
In the case of psychoanalysis, welcomed in each and every discipline over the last century, it 
is clear that this misunderstanding is not due to a lack of understanding but to a reluctance to 
understand; a passion for ignorance as Lacan would call it. And the reason for this reluctance is 
the same as Freud predicted: why, after all, would we embrace a discourse whose likely outcome 
is to show us our own ugliness, confront us with the self who, even if we suspected we harboured, 
hoped no one else would realize we had?  
Does this misunderstanding extend to the reception of psychoanalysis in the legal academy? 
My fear is it does. Like many attempts, particularly in vogue at the start of this century to ‘wed’ 
law with other disciplines, the enthusiastic conjoining of law with psychoanalysis, far from 
critiquing and challenging law, ended up consolidating law’s existing presuppositions. 
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Consciously or unconsciously, the enthusiasm for such unions (and I include myself in this merry-
go-round) addressed, but unfortunately did not redress, the limitations of our own discipline. We 
fell prey, that is, to the classic lover’s delusion: all-too-well aware of own weaknesses and 
limitations, we abdicated the work, and the responsibility, for our salvation to the other discipline, 
duping ourselves into believing that our beloved would make up for our lack. Conveniently 
ignoring that, as Lacan (1979) put it a propos all relationships (whether they are between humans 
or between disciplines), ‘in persuading the other that he has that which may compliment us, we 
assure ourselves of being able to continue to misunderstand precisely what we lack.’ (p. 133)  
What is it that we continue to willfully misunderstand, about ourselves or our discipline, and 
will do anything to avoid encountering? Lacan coined a neologism for the ultimate goal of a 
successful analysis: the hope is not to adjust the patient to reality, nor to mould her in the person 
of the analyst, nor to ‘reconcile her with her demons’ (as popular parlance has it), but to confront 
her with her own extimate core. And what is the extimate? The extimate is that part of ourselves 
that is so painfully intimate that we have hidden not somewhere far away, nor only from other 
people, but inside us, from ourselves: we have excluded it, from others and from ourselves, in the 
interior. Lacan’s (2006) metaphor for the message of psychoanalysis, and how it is categorically 
not psychotherapy, is not dissimilar to Freud’s, and for the same reasons: we have to treat it, he 
suggests, like the tumour that it is and that is spreading, and exteriorize it (p. 274). This means we 
must bring it to the surface, that is, the surface of the signifier.  
Although the extimate, as we just said, is usually painstakingly and safely hidden out of 
view, occasionally, not often, but once in a while, we are confronted with it in all its raw and 
obscene excess: no attempt is made to hide it and the shock is not only at its nakedness but its 
shameless refusal to hide. This is the challenge, I suggest, posed by Joshua Oppenheimer’s The 
Act of Killing. At the end of our excavation into Law’s unconscious I will illustrate the 
culmination of our analysis with this film, a documentary that I will argue displays the extimate 
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not only as an intrinsic part of the legal order but as the Law itself. My grim conclusion will be 
that when the extimate is not only the hidden core of the Law, but has become the Law itself, the 
subject has no choice but to acknowledge her own complicity in it. That is, she has no choice but 
to confront the abyss not only at the heart of her fellow beings, nor only of the symbolic order, but 
at the heart of herself.  
 
2. Successful Misunderstanding 
 
We are fortunate that Robert Burt was not only present at the start of the psychoanalytic 
turn in law in the United States but has generously given us an account of his participation, in the 
form of a description of Anna Freud’s seminars at Yale. Despite the grace of his account, we do 
not need to read between the lines to gauge what he found worrying about Anna Freud’s style: 
confident, overbearing, bordering on ‘dogmatism’ he intimates. Lacan I believe would not only 
have nodded in agreement with Burt’s observations but, unlike Professor Burt, would have been a 
lot less circumspect in his choice of epithets and less sparing in his critique. The direction taken by 
Lacan thereafter, however, ‘the direction of the treatment’ as he called it in a famous intervention, 
is much less optimistic than Burt’s, and much less benign. Rather than aiming, let alone hoping for 
‘a democratic resolution’ of the patient’s conflicts in fruitful cooperation with a judge or therapist 
in the ‘holding place’ of the therapist’s room or courtroom, as Burt proposes, it is no exaggeration 
to say the Lacanian analyst aims not at a ‘resolution’ but a ‘dissolution’ of the subject, not at a 
‘synthesis’ but a separation of the fake identifications that give the patient’s ego the illusion of 
identity.  
Lacanian analysis is a bloody and gruesome process that, far from rectifying the patient’s 
conflicts and leading each adversary to come to a democratic empathy with the other’s viewpoint, 
aims at shifting the ground from under all participants’ feet, including, aptly, that of the analyst / 
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judge. For the Lacanian analyst is not there to judge, punish, forgive, cooperate with or reconcile 
the patient with her adversaries, real or imaginary. The analyst’s goal is much more ambitious and 
much more painful: it aims at shuttering the subject as she finds her and making room for the birth 
of a new subject. Once the deed is done, the analyst, and the moribund ex-subject that used to be 
her patient, can slip gently out of view, making way for a new subject: a true and ethical subject. 
For Lacan the reception of psychoanalysis not only in the United States but worldwide was 
premised on a fundamental, and, for better or worse, phenomenally successful, misunderstanding: 
psychoanalysis, he felt compelled to keep repeating, is not psychotherapy. In particular 
psychotherapy all-too-often proceeds as if there are only two people in the room, ignoring the 
inevitable presence of the Big Other of the symbolic order, ‘the mediation that speech constitutes 
between subjects.’ (Lacan, 2006, p. 288) It is the presence of the third - an uninvited presence 
forced on us all – that renders psychoanalysis a preeminently social and political activity. Our 
psyche and its pains are never just ours, but are on loan from the Big Other of the symbolic order. 
Until and unless this forced debt is acknowledged, and shaken off, no patient can claim to confront 
her neuroses. In particular, without taking into account the dimension of the symbolic, any dyadic 
relationship, (between patient and analyst, or litigant and judge) remains at the level of the 
imaginary and worse, Lacan warns, the imaginary becomes the norm. So, despite the fact that 
Freud was at pains to distinguish between the imaginary and reality, psychoanalysts, Lacan (2006) 
accuses, first ‘made the imaginary into another reality, and then, in our times, [found] in the 
imaginary the norm of reality.’ (p. 388)  
For Lacan none was guiltier of this pathological misreading of Freud than ego psychologists 
including Anna Freud and her followers, the same posse Robert Burt discusses and so presciently 
found wanting. Lacan waged a long vendetta against ego psychologists’ teachings and practices as 
propagated by its troika in the US, a triumvirate made up of Ernst Kris, who had left Vienna for 
the US during the war, Rudolf Lowenstein, who had been Lacan’s own analyst, and Heinz 
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Hartmann who had been in analysis with Freud (Fink, 2004, pp. 38-62). In scathing and repeated 
attacks on the treatment meted to patients by these prophets, Lacan lambasts them for presuming 
to try to ‘cure’ their patients’ egos: a euphemism, as far as Lacan (2006) was concerned, for trying 
to reshape their patients in line with the analyst’s ego, serving as ‘an excuse’, that is, ‘for the 
analyst’s narcissism’. (p. 288)  
 Lacan saw this as a wider plot by ego psychologists along the lines of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal: he mocks Kris as the intellectual leader of the ‘New Deal of ego psychology’ who makes it 
his business to exhort the analysand to adopt to her social environment and to so-called reality: 
‘Kris’ ideas about intellectual productivity’, Lacan (2006) concludes, ‘thus seem to me to receive 
the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for America.’ (p. 332) In the process ego psychologists 
forget that the ego, the product of and steeped in the imaginary, is not only ‘the seat of illusions’ 
(Lacan, 1991, p. 62) but ‘frustration in its very essence.’ (Lacan, 2006, p. 208) The theory of the 
ego, to put it bluntly (as Lacan often did), is nothing short of ‘an enormous error.’ (Lacan, 2006, p. 
395) Far from ‘curing’ this imaginary prosthetic of ours, the Lacanian analyst must lead it to 
recognize its own fundamental sickness and direct it to accept its own demise. Not least because 
what for ego-psychologists constitutes a supposedly ‘healthy’ ego, is, for lacanian analysts, all the 
sicker: for the subject as well as for those unfortunately enough to be around her.  
While ego psychologists bear the brunt of Lacan’s wrath it is no exaggeration to suggest that 
the reception of psychoanalysis generally, on both sides of the Atlantic, has been one of successful 
misunderstanding. We are never far from using and abusing psychoanalytic terms in every day 
speech, yet the ubiquity of Freud’s vocabulary in our language, far from proving an acceptance or 
even an understanding of his teaching, is made at the same time as the implication of 
psychoanalytic insights is radically denied. The paradoxical result of the appeal to psychoanalysis 
therefore is to domesticate rather than confront the challenge posed by the unconscious. 
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Does this misunderstanding extend to the Yale School of Law and Psychoanalysis? As I 
started suggesting, Robert Burt’s polite reservations concerning his seminars with Anna Freud 
would have found (loud and ostentatious) agreement from Lacan. Lacan would have been less 
sanguine, however, and much less optimistic about Burt’s reading of psychoanalysis’ ‘lessons’ for 
law thereafter. If there’s one theme pervading Burt’s work is the hope that judges can become 
‘reliable guides for disputing parties – even deeply opposed parties – in working toward 
amelioration and mutually satisfying resolution of their conflicts.’ This aspiration, he suggests, is 
also that of psychotherapists, whether the conflict they are addressing is that between two persons 
or within the conflict-driven mind of one person, their patient: in the same way that ‘a 
psychotherapist assists the patient in coming to recognize the previously warring portions of his 
mind’, so a judge can try to lead ‘the warring litigants to recognize one another without fear or 
hostility.’ As the psychotherapist aims to help the patient resolve the conflict in their psyche, so 
the judge aims to resolve the conflict between litigants, ideally with a decision, or interpretation of 
the law that is offered for agreement even to the losing side. The latter will be instructed, in effect, 
that whether they like it or not, there is ‘an agreed communal meaning to the law and that they 
have wrongly interpreted that law.’ The upshot of a psychotherapeutically-inspired legal 
proceedings can form the starting point, Burt suggests, for ‘friendly interaction’, ‘new mutually 
respectful’ and ‘egalitarian social relationships’ indeed for an ‘egalitarian democratic society’. ‘I 
see’, Burt concludes, ‘psychoanalysis as a training ground for a democratic relationship with 
others.’  
My fear is Lacan’s response to these all-too-worthy yet all-too-optimistic aims would have 
been a dry, ‘Bonne chance avec ça’. Lacan’s despair at the reception and mis-reception of Freud’s 
work stemmed from his own insistence on the precedence of the signifier and Freud’s readers’ (in 
this case including his own daughter Anna) all-too common tendency to underplay its importance. 
It is not only separation from the mother, or sexuality, that is traumatic in Freud, and even less so 
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in Lacan. Language itself is a traumatizing force, traumatic precisely because human bodies are 
invaded by a force that they neither invite nor control, yet have no choice but to accommodate. So 
all our experiences, and not just sexuality (as caricatures of Freud would have it), are refracted 
through and distorted by signifiers that are at the mercy of the Big Other of language. It is because 
of Lacan’s insistence on the subject’s determination by the signifier that he had little faith in the 
benign communication and understanding hoped for by Burt, whether the ‘holding place’ is that of 
a therapist’s couch or a court of law.  
 
3. The First Castration 
 
For Lacan, as for Freud, the story of psychoanalysis is a story of loss: there is no human 
subject who has not suffered a loss, and the first thing we lose is the plenitude that came before 
our immersion into language. For Lacan the first castration inflicted on the human being is not by 
a real or imaginary father threatening punishment but from our introduction to language. Human 
beings’ entry into language is not only alienating but violent: as soon as our demands are 
formulated in signifiers, the seemingly simple dimension of ‘need’ is transformed into the 
troublesome dimension of ‘desire’ because signifiers never quite fit: the words at our disposal 
never coincide with our bodies or the world around us. Hence Lacan’s famous aphorism, 
following Hegel, that ‘the word is the murder of the thing.’ Our social order, including our legal 
order, just like our subjectivity, is founded on this primal and irretrievable loss. What we are left 
with is the hope of recuperating this loss, that is, with desire.  
Unfortunately it is not only bittersweet and impossible desire that is born with language, but 
also repression and thereby the unconscious: from the moment we start to speak, says Lacan 
(1998), ‘from that exact moment onward and not before … there is such thing as repression.’ (p. 
56) And we repress because not only language never quite fits the signifieds we presume to 
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represent but because language is outside the subject and at the mercy of the symbolic order: ‘The 
fact that the symbolic is located outside of man is the very notion of the unconscious.’ (Lacan, 
2006, p. 392) There is only one outcome to our conscription into language and that is irredeemable 
lack: lack emerges from the invasion of the symbolic, ‘by the fact that the subject depends on the 
signifier and that the signifier is first of all in the field of the Other.’ (Lacan, 1979, pp. 204-5)  
From then on we are condemned to stop making sense of ourselves, and of each other. If we 
communicate with each other at all, it is not because we touch each other’s truth but because we 
successfully misunderstand each other: ‘misunderstanding’ concludes Lacan (1993), ‘is the very 
basis of interhuman discourse.’ (p. 163). Of course, far from heeding this hiccup, the speaking 
being’s reaction is to keep talking and talk even more: we babble on demanding, in effect, that we 
are heard and, even more optimistically, that we are understood.  Unfortunately, as Lacan (2008) 
adds, ‘language cannot be other than a demand, a demand that fails.’ (p. 124) 
 
4. Free to Speak Emptily 
 
If language belongs and is at the mercy of the Big Other, not of the subject, and before the 
subject is even born, then what sense does it make to talk about free speech? And what is the 
significance of recognizing the loss inflicted by language for the human subject generally, and for 
the legal subject in particular? For psychoanalysis the castration wrought by language is so central, 
that our ability to lie is in fact what constitutes us as subjects. Beginning to lie means we have 
worked out that there is a gap between the word and the thing itself, and, moreover, that we can 
use that gap, for better, or worse ends. No wonder lawyers, whose skill is at manipulating 
language, are thought to dwell, and thrive, in a polite, if not contemptible distance from the truth, 
since at least Plato’s Gorgias. 
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Since lies are at the heart of language, indeed since language itself is a lie, a representation 
whose very point is to stand in for something else, for psychoanalysis, the contrast is not between 
free and coerced speech but between full and empty speech. Sadly most of our utterances, in or out 
of Court, are no more than empty speech, chewed up leftovers of other people’s meals that barely 
touch the truth: our utterances are always already borrowed from, framed by and structured by an 
order that we belong to not ‘freely’ but through our forced conscription into language. The only 
hope is that some ‘full speech’ will ‘hitch a lift’ with our empty speech when we are busy 
chattering.  
For psychoanalysis the instrument for this hope is free association; its wager is that free 
association can bridge the gap between full and empty speech, between speaking and being spoken 
for by language. Even free association, however, can only partially achieve this since free 
association does not faithfully repeat but often tames and domesticates the unconscious. Indeed, as 
Lacan cruelly pointed out, there is nothing ‘free’ about free association since to associate ‘freely’ 
is the hardest and most daring act an analysand can achieve: once the analysand lets go of the hold 
the Big Other (here in the person of the analyst) has on her and speaks ‘freely’, the analysis is 
over. Sadly even in the idealized safe ‘holding’ place imagined by Robert Burt in a 
therapeutically-inspired courtroom, the odds that the parties will let go of their illusions about 
themselves, let alone of their adversaries, let go of the hold of the Big Other (here in the form of 
the judge), and engage in ‘free associative speech’ are slim indeed. 
In contrast to legal thinking, for psychoanalysis the subject’s speech is no indication of the 
subject’s truth, indeed for psychoanalysis the subject’s truth emerges when the subject disappears 
or, in Freudian terms, when she ‘slips’. It is not what we say but what ‘escapes’ that is important: 
as Lacan (2006) responds to Descartes, ‘I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am 
not thinking.’ (p. 430) That is, the core of our subjectivity is not our thinking, or our speaking, or 
our doing, but our cut: when we stumble in our thoughts, our words or our acts and unwittingly 
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betray our lack rather than our mastery, that is when we encounter a fragment of the truth. As 
Lacan (1998) spells it out, it is when we stop thinking, when we utter stupidities that we may find 
out something about our desire: ‘The subject is not the one who thinks. The subject is precisely the 
one we encourage, not to say it all, as we tell him in order to charm him, but rather to utter 
stupidities ... It is precisely to the extent that the guy is willing not to think anymore that we will 
perhaps learn a little bit more about it.’ (pp. 21-22) Without the willingness to speak not only 
‘freely’ but ‘fully’ and indeed thoughtlessly, however safe the holding place of the courtroom Burt 
envisages, and however much the judge may abdicate her hierarchical status, we cannot hope to 
arrive at the truth. 
 The repercussions of this insight for legal systems are overwhelming. If, as psychoanalysis 
suggests, the divided subject does not know the truth about herself, the assumption in legal 
systems that a subject may be relied on to give truthful evidence about herself or others becomes 
suspect. One can surmise here the gulf between free association, through which, eventually, and 
after a great deal of resistance, the subject’s unconscious truth may be glimpsed and the carefully 
drafted legal statements. If free association is one way to approximate the subject’s unconscious, 
the ‘anything but random’ parties’ affidavits and statements in legal cases are as far away from the 
truth of the subject as it is possible to get. In particular, the parties in a legal process try to control 
the meaning of their words before their utterance. For psychoanalysis, however, the only relevant 
meaning is the one determined retroactively, after the words have been spoken; it is at that point 
that we can look back and examine whether our unconscious, the only speaking part of us that 
doesn’t lie, has given us away, or, which is the same thing, led us to our own truth.  
 This explains the lack of conviction in legal language even when it convicts and indeed 
punishes. For psychoanalysis, despite legal injunctions, on oath and on more, we can never know 
the ‘truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ because that is precisely what we will not say. 
(Fink, 2007, p. 32) This is why the analyst/judge, in contrast to Burt’s plea, must refrain from 
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trying to fathom what, if anything, the subject ‘means’, or ‘intends’ to say. The analyst/judge must 
focus only on what is spoken: to the utterance, the surface of the signifier. As Lacan (2006) 
protests, ‘I repeatedly tell my students, “Don’t try to understand!’’ (p. 394) Trying to understand, 
again, is a sure recipe for the slippery slope back to the imaginary; the analyst’s task, on the 
contrary, is to maintain the inscrutable position of the dummy in a game of poker, or, as Lacan 
points out in his analysis of Las Meninas, Velázquez's position in the painting that he is painting. 
The aim is not to understand but to enable the patient/litigant to come face to face with the truth of 
her utterance, whether or not she ‘meant’ it. Above all, if there is such a thing as a right answer in 
analysis, it does not lie with Herculean judges but with the analysand herself: the analysand (or, in 
Burt’s analogy, the litigant) who has let go of pre-rehearsed scripts, not the one insisting on 
controlling her own as well as her adversary’s speech, is the one who will encounter the truth.  
 
5. The Law Made Me Do It! 
 
If the legal process cannot be relied on to deliver the truth, then what is the function of law 
for psychoanalysis? For Lacan the stop-gap of language that gives rise to desire is not only 
inevitable nor all negative: a full realization of desire would be catastrophic for the subject. A limit 
is necessary not only for creating desire but for preventing its full realization, which would spell 
the end of subjectivity. Lacan refers to the hypothetical scenario of an unlimited realization of 
desire as a state of unlimited jouissance which would be a state of constant, if blissful, torment for 
the subject.  
This is where Law comes in very useful: in setting a limit to jouissance, Law gives birth to 
desire within the confines of the symbolic order, within the pleasure principle; for the pleasure 
principle, paradoxically, does not seek unlimited pleasure but manageable pleasure: in effect what 
the pleasure principle demands is that ‘pleasure should cease.’ (Lacan, 1991, p. 84) Prohibition 
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therefore incites desire within the parameters of the law: as Lacan (2006) explains, ‘It is not the 
Law that bars the subject’s access to jouissance – it simply makes a barred subject out of an 
almost natural barrier … The true function of the Father is fundamentally to unite (and not to 
oppose) a desire to the Law.’ (pp. 696-698) Let’s not forget also law’s prohibitions are reassuring 
for the subject, making it look that what we cannot attain due to our inherent lack is instead 
prohibited: much easier to blame the law for our perennial dissatisfaction than have to admit our 
own limitations. Nathaniel Hawthorn’s notorious ‘limit-loving classes’ is not just one class but all 
of us. 
 
6. The Obscene Remainder 
 
If Law functioned only to create and sustain our desire through its prohibitions, enabling us 
to navigate close to the sun but without us risking being burned by it, then we might, occasionally 
at least, be thankful for its interventions. Unfortunately there is not just one law, or indeed, in 
lacanese, one father. Lacan calls the benign law masking our limitations with its prohibitions the 
symbolic law, or law of the father, enabling us to adjust to and endure, more or less unsuccessfully 
and more or less painfully, the symbolic order. There is another law, however, and another father, 
and this is the remnant of Freud’s primal father of Totem and Taboo, whose murder is never 
deadly enough: as with all gods and fathers, we can never kill them completely.  
In Freud’s mythology, the primordial crime that establishes a community of legal subjects is 
the sons’ murder of the father. Once the real father is dead he returns as the symbolic father: the 
all-enjoying, all-prohibitive primal father is domesticated and transformed into the ‘Name of the 
Father’, presiding over the symbolic order in the form of public rules and principles. The 
transformation, however, is not seamless. A surplus remains from the primal father haunting the 
symbolic and what remains, Žižek (1992, 2000) insists, is the obscene underside: the remainder of 
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the dead father of Totem and Taboo is the excess that has not been absorbed by the symbolic 
order.
 For Žižek this obscene underside to the public law is intrinsic to the functioning of the 
system and indeed supports and guarantees it. 
Does our legal discourse acknowledge this remainder? Of course not: modern legal 
philosophy, from Kant’s The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals to Dworkin’s Law’s 
Empire today, we see a rehearsal of the hope that reason and pure form in the guise of the rule of 
law can eradicate pernicious acts. What insistence on pure form however does not appreciate is 
that adherence to form generates its own libidinal enjoyment. Žižek calls this the obscene surplus, 
referring to the all-too familiar scenario of subjects deriving libidinal satisfaction from the 
supposedly neutral activity of performing their duty: whether it is following the rules, obeying 
orders, or filling in the forms. Alenka Župancic (1996) explains this alliance between obscene 
pleasure and duty: it’s as if ‘the pathological’, she writes, ‘takes revenge and imposes its law by 
planting a certain kind of pleasure on the path along which we follow the categorical imperative.’ 
(p. 120) We don’t have to delve into the annals of history for examples of subjects using their 
‘legal duty’ as an excuse for committing evil acts ‘legally’. The ongoing refugee crisis at Europe’s 
borders comes with daily instances of police, soldiers, and guards claiming they are ‘following 
orders’ when ruthlessly attacking refugees trying to cross the border. The excess violence we 
witness goes far beyond their ‘legal duty’ and shows the perverse enjoyment hidden but inherent 
in the supposed ‘neutral’ activity of enforcing the law.  
Far from being isolated ‘bad apples’ in an otherwise functioning system, such excess, Žižek 
argues, is part and parcel of the machinery of prohibition. Žižek (1991) goes further to suggest that 
one only becomes a ‘full’ member of a community not when she identifies with the community’s 
explicit rules, but when she participates in its hidden rules, its obscene underside and in its 
excesses (p. iv). As Freud started exploring in Group Psychology and Lacan (2006) spells out 
 14 
more bluntly, the ‘feeling that most solidly ties the troop together’ is ‘knowledge in a pathetic 
form; people commune in it without communicating, and it is called hatred.’ (p. 400)  
 
7. Castrated Law 
 
We have come some distance from Robert Burt’s hope that psychoanalysis might teach 
lawyers respectful and mutual understanding. What the analysis has shown instead is a 
fundamentally castrated and lacking subject that cannot be trusted to understand or reconcile 
herself with herself, let alone with her adversaries. It gets worse: if, as I have described, language 
inflicts a fundamental division on the subject, a division that we only grudgingly and 
embarrassingly acknowledge, what is harder to acknowledge and come to terms with, is not that 
we ourselves are divided, but that the entity we direct our demands to, the Big Other of Law, or 
Government, is also irretrievably cut. For psychoanalysis, however, the gap in the constitution of 
the human subject is matched by a gap in the Big Other of the symbolic order, including the legal 
order: indeed laws, politics, religions and culture are so many (incomplete) attempts to gloss over 
and efface this gap. We turn to them precisely because we are ourselves divided. 
In contemporary societies, the view that the Big Other is itself divided, that the symbolic 
order is ‘not all’, that the Law is already castrated is an open secret. On a daily basis we cannot 
fail to witness blunders and irregularities, if not outright crimes, committed by our governments, 
civil servants, police, priests, and numerous others in positions of authority. In the legal arena, 
notwithstanding Ronald Dworkin’s persistent claims of Judge Hercules’ infallibility and 
omniscience, every law student and every lay observer can detect the cracks in Law’s castle. What 
is it that holds the building together then, if not the same passion for ignorance that we 
encountered earlier, the same will to continue to misunderstand that, in the case of society, we call 
ideology?  
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What does ideology efface in the case of Law? For starters, what ideology does a good job 
at concealing in the case of the legal system is the violence at Law’s conception. What, after all, is 
Law’s origin? If, as modern man proudly claims to have established, Law is not a set of rules 
issued by an omniscient deity up above, then how does it appear? One of Freud’s most devastating 
claims for lawyers is that law and the legal system are not created to dispense justice or even order 
or even efficiency. As he explains the origin of prohibitions with disarming simplicity, what other 
origin can we impute to the creation of laws, than that of desire itself? Take the ultimate law of 
laws, the incest taboo and indeed all taboos: ‘Since taboos’, Freud (1913) reminds us, ‘are mainly 
expressed in prohibitions, the underlying presence of a positive current of desire may occur to us 
as something quite obvious and calling for no lengthy proofs… For, after all, there is no need to 
prohibit something that no one desires to do, and a thing that is forbidden with the greatest 
emphasis must be a thing that is desired.’(p. 69) So it is the subject’s renunciation of her desires 
rather than her striving after lofty ideals that leads to the creation of laws, religions, and moralities 
Have we made any progress from so-called primitive taboos with our modern law? In 
contrast to many Gods and many religions, modern law prides itself not on issuing prohibitions 
from above, but on enabling the subject to participate in governance and in law-making. Kant in 
particular is credited with divorcing ethics from religion as well as any notion of a Supreme Good. 
In his account of morals, Kant doesn’t look for the Good: what determines the morality of our 
action, he insists, is not its content, but its form. The only criterion for a law becoming universal is 
conformity to the categorical imperative and the categorical imperative does not prescribe any 
particular content.  
 Freud is not impressed with Kant’s achievement: despite his nobility and optimism, even 
Kant, in Freud’s view, could not eliminate pathological elements from the source, let alone the 
application, of the law.  For Freud (1913) what Kant calls the moral law, the inner voice of 
conscience which utters the categorical imperative, is nothing other than the superego and the 
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superego is indistinguishable from the workings of taboos in pre-modern societies; the categorical 
imperative, in short, is a remnant of the primitive within modernity: ‘taboos still exist among us. 
Though expressed in a negative form and directed toward another subject-matter, they do not 
differ in their psychological nature from Kant’s categorical imperative’, which operates in a 
‘compulsive fashion and rejects any conscious motives.’ (p. xiv)  
Is Freud right to dismiss Kant’s noble aims so easily? What Freud appreciated, and Lacan 
spelled out, is that when form is all there is to law, and no specific content is prescribed, the law 
itself functions like a taboo, rendering formal law, like the superego, a sadistic agency. Indeed the 
‘emptiness’ of formal law, the fact that it doesn’t enunciate any notion of the Good other than 
doing one’s duty, can lead the subject to do something not only for the sake of duty but only for 
the sake of duty. That is, a subject can conform to the formal structure of the categorical 
imperative irrespective of the substantive content of that imperative, in other words, while 
pursuing diabolically evil ends. A famous abuse of Kantian ethics was of course Eichmann’s 
appeal to Kant during his trial in Jerusalem; throughout the proceedings Eichmann insisted that, in 
putting himself in the position of the instrument of the Big Other’s – here the Fürher’s – will, he 
was only performing his ‘duty’. There is no guarantee, therefore, that conformity to the categorical 
imperative will render an act ‘pure’, that is, untainted by pathological motives, while evil acts can 
still be ‘pure’ that is, conform perfectly to the categorical imperative.  
 We are full circle back to Freud’s insight that the origin of law is desire. Kant’s categorical 
imperative, far from being free from pathological desires, is animated by those desires at their 
extreme: even when we obey the moral law, our motive for obeying it is still pathological self-
interest. Lacan (1979) agrees: Kant’s moral law, he concludes, ‘looked at more closely, is simply 
desire in its pure state.’ (p. 275) The moral law derives its power to bind us from the desires we 
ourselves repress when we follow it: as we repress our desires and follow the law, we find 
substitute satisfaction in the law itself. In that sense, we do not repress our desires because of the 
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law; we have law because we have repressed our desires. This is the added, ‘obscene’, dimension 
to the ‘noble’ concept of duty that we prefer to forget.  
 
8. The Law is the Law 
 
If the genesis of every law is repression of our desire, then what makes any legal system, 
lawful? What gives a system of laws its supremacy over other systems? For psychoanalysis, the 
founding gesture of the legal system is a crime so radical it redefines the existing standards of 
legality and illegality. The genius of the arch-crime is that it dissolves its own criminality by 
negating and overcoming the existing definitions of what is legal and what is criminal: ‘it turns its 
own transgression into a new order.’ (Žižek, 2009, p. 40) Like Brecht’s, ‘what is the robbery of a 
bank, compared to the founding of a new bank’ the founding of a new legal system was preceded 
by a crime so great it overthrew the existing system and set up a new one. Once the crime is 
universalized it no longer appears as a crime but it turns from transgression into a new order 
masquerading as universal law. So law, although a crime at its inception, becomes ‘universalized 
crime.’(Žižek, 2009, p. 41)  
Although this is the case with every system, by and large this is not an origin lawyers choose 
to dwell on. The rationale for contemporary calls to pay restitution to the descendants of victims of 
past injustices, from slavery, to colonialism, to apartheid, is the acknowledgement of the original 
crime that set up the system and a false hope that somehow the system can ‘cleanse’ itself of the 
crime that installed it in power in the first place. What is left of the law once we appreciate its 
violent roots, the obscene dimension at its core, and its own continuing castration? Is it any more 
than a tautology, the law is the law and there is nothing beyond, or behind or before it? Perhaps, as 
the priest explains to Joseph K when he wanders into the Cathedral, ‘it is not necessary to accept it 
as true; one must only accept it as necessary.’ (Kafka, 1953, p. 243) 
 18 
 
9. The Extimate Becomes the Law  
 
Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentary of the Indonesian genocide of communists in 1965-66 
in The Act of Killing goes a step further in its depiction of the creation and maintenance of a legal 
system. The film is shocking, to put it mildly, not only because of its depiction of unspeakable 
crimes, but in the very method of their depiction; not only is the extimate displayed in all its 
obscene and traumatic horror, but the extimate, what in most subjects and systems is safely hidden 
out of view, has, in this instance, acquired the status of the Law itself.  
Oppenheimer’s technique for approximating the extimate is the time-honoured technique of 
poets who have been excavating the unconscious centuries before anyone had heard of Freud: 
truth here appears through the medium of fiction or, in its twenty-first century form, the cinematic 
screen. It is also the technique these killers say they used when perpetrating the massacres: their 
killings, were not ‘only’ killings, they claim. They were performances, shaped by and modeled 
after Hollywood movies: ‘Each genre had its own method of killing’, explains the film’s 
protagonist and master assassin, Anwar Congo: ‘Depending on whether we were actors in a mafia 
movie, or a western, or a musical, the method of killing would vary, and be faithful to the 
original’. What of course Anwar persists in ignoring (and the film’s director is complicit in my 
view in allowing him to keep ignoring) is that in performing these Hollywood fictions they were 
perpetrating a gruesome truth: the genocide of over one million communists in Indonesia.  
So what truths can we gauge from Oppenheimer’s admittedly sleek, if not ‘enjoyable’ 
movie? The movie amplifies and displays what was already at the heart of every legal system; that 
is, we must not pathologise Indonesia’s history as being somewhat out of the ordinary or that the 
legal order precipitated by the 1965 military coup is somehow unique. At the origin of every legal 
system, not only that of Indonesia, is a crime that, having asserted its own supremacy, can now 
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proclaim itself to be the universal law. In most legal systems this is safely hidden in the archives 
of history and not delved into, let alone celebrated. What is shocking and haunting about the 
depiction of the Indonesian legal system is that this history, far from hidden, is displayed with glee 
and pride by the perpetrators: ‘We won’, we hear them saying time and again, ‘so why should we 
hide? Indeed, should any of the survivors’ children dare to raise their voice in criticism, or, god 
forbid, revenge, we will exterminate them’. This is Anwar’s confident response not only to the 
filmmaker but on national television, to the applause of the studio audience and of the chat show 
host herself.  
If there’s violence at the heart of the constitution of the legal system, there is no doubt that 
continuing violence has to be exerted for that system to maintain its supremacy. In most systems it 
is usually the preserve of the coercive powers of the State, the police and prison system. In the 
case Oppenheimer chronicles, this power is not only blatant but again on the surface. The ‘muscle’ 
as it were for the continuing exertion of power by the regime that perpetrated the genocide is the 
paramilitary Pancasila Youth whose three million members did the military’s ‘grunt’ work. In the 
film members of Pencasila Youth display all the characteristics of the crowd described by Freud in 
Group Psychology: feeling ‘invincible’ when in the group, they thirst for obedience and crave 
authority. For Freud what binds the members of the group together is love for the leader to whom 
they bestow the attributes of the ideal ego. For Žižek (and Oppenheimer’s film bears this out) the 
bonds that bind are much less benign and likely obscene. They are, first and foremost, an 
investment in shared guilt for their common crimes. Pancasila’s leader also bears all the 
characteristics of Freud’s primal father in Totem and Taboo: we see him repeatedly asserting his 
power over other members of the group by arrogating to himself the right to enjoy any and all 
women he meets. His minions bestow this privilege to him on a regular basis and can’t wait to 
entertain their leader with dirty jokes about insatiable women. If Freud had been observing 
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Pancasila Youth instead of Australian tribes, his analysis in Totem and Taboo would have been 
identical, because Australian tribes and Indonesia’s youth are all of us.  
When the extimate has not only taken over but has become the Law, what recourse does the 
subject have? In Oppenheimer’s follow-up film, The Look of Silence, the brother of one of the 
victims revisits the scenes of his brother’s gruesome torture and murder and confronts the 
perpetrators with their actions. The response, predictably, is, at best, a refusal to admit they knew: 
like Žižek’s oft-repeated correction to Donald Rumsfeld’s epistemological categories, these people 
know but they don’t want to know: ‘I had no idea this was going on next door’ we hear them 
saying. In the background, even the perpetrators shake their heads in disbelief; much more us the 
audience. At other times, the response, far from a relatively benign ‘Sorry, I didn’t know’, is more 
thinly veiled threats: ‘Why are you digging here? You want the massacres to start all over again? 
Because if you keep digging, they will!’ We are left fearing not only for the film-makers, but for 
the few brave survivors who are willing to break the silence.  
 We have come a long way from Robert Burt’s hope that a psychotherapeutically-inspired 
legal process might aid democratic communication and understanding between adversaries. What 
a psychoanalytic reading has enabled us to see here, is the extimate at the very heart of the law, 
including law supposedly faithful to Enlightenment ideals of freedom and the rule of law. Could 
the connection between law, freedom and evil be closer than we want to admit? Kant (1958) for 
one, in his later work, started wondering whether man’s capacity for evil was itself a product of 
his freedom. Could the Enlightenment ideas of reason, moral autonomy, and universality, as 
several philosophers have started to ask, be responsible for the very moral disasters they claimed 
to overcome (Copjec ed., 1996)? There is no doubt that the perpetrators of Indonesia’s genocide 
do not hide their admiration for Western culture, which throughout the film functions as their ideal 
ego: it is not the audience in Jakarta they are thinking of when staging their reenactments, but 
London and Hollywood studios.  
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 In a perverted twist that no Freudian would dismiss as a coincidence, and every Lacanian 
would see as confirming the primacy of the signifier, Pancasila Youth insist that the word ‘pre-
man’ (designating ‘gangsters’ in the Indonesian language), is actually identical to the word ‘free 
man’. Gangsters are free men and freemen are gangsters, is the recurring message and celebration 
in their narrative. Since gangsters are the champions of freedom, where would Indonesian or any 
society be without us, they ask. It is a distortion of the signifier that the American government’s 
support for the coup during the height of the Cold War failed to correct. Not to mention the 
political as well as military assistance provided to the Indonesian military by US agencies that not 
only turned a blind eye to the genocide but actively encouraged and supported it.
i
 Paradoxically at 
its ‘best’, this is what a psychoanalytic excavation of law enables us to see: not the greatness 
generated by our ideas and ideals of freedom, enlightenment, and law, but their obverse: their 




 How has the encounter between law and psychoanalysis managed to reach such 
diametrically different conclusions to those of Robert Burt that we saw earlier? While the attempts 
to shrug off, resist, domesticate, or simply co-opt Freud’s menacing message have taken many 
forms over the last century, I venture a suggestion as to the cause and source of this willful 
misunderstanding. My hunch is that psychoanalysis has been treated as an ‘and’, an addition or 
enhancement to the study of law, a discipline with which to wed, treat, and explore legal concepts 
and processes. While this coupling of law with psychoanalysis can lead to fruitful collaborations, 
as Robert Burt’s article so aptly describes, what it misses is psychoanalysis’ primary challenge not 
only to legal discourse but to all discourses: rather than aiming to ‘wed’ another discipline for the 
mutual advantage of both, in a process of mutual understanding and exchange, psychoanalysis, 
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whether we like it or not, aims to expose what lies underneath another discourse’s primary 
presuppositions, an exposure that is not always pretty and, should it be carried to its conclusion, 
would lead not only to shame and embarrassment but to the destruction of the subject and/or 
discipline.  
 In the case of legal discourse, psychoanalysis problematizes law’s primary presupposition, 
that is, the distinction between the public realm of law and state on the one hand and the private 
realm of the individual on the other. It points out that the distinction between public and private is 
problematic because what is supposedly most intimate and hidden by and from the subject is taken 
from outside: from our parents, teachers, public figures and the symbolic order of language and 
culture. For psychoanalysis the distinction between self and other, subject and neighbor, inside 
and outside is blurred because the most intimate part of ourselves is taken from outside, from the 
other. As Freud (1921) started exploring, ‘In the individual’s mental life, someone else is 
invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very 
first individual psychology … is at the same time social psychology as well.’ (p. 69)  
 Psychoanalysis is not the first discourse to challenge the distinction between public and 
private bequeathed to us by liberal theory, or to critique its limitations and convenient ability to 
ignore injustices that are perpetrated in the off-limit realm of the ‘home’. Psychoanalysis goes 
further, however, in pointing out that the two realms are not only linked but continuous and, like 
the moebus strip, indistinguishable. Rather than turning legal discourse upside down, 
psychoanalysis turns it inside out: that is, it reveals not the opposite or antithesis of legal 
discourse, not what is outside or even excluded by it, but its other side, that is, the ideologies, 
fantasies and unconscious desires that support legal discourse from underneath. And 
unfortunately, as we saw in the course of this article, the underside is not always healthy or clean 
but obscene and dirty. No wonder then every subject and every system, prefer to keep it out of 
view. 
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 As I explored in my Taking the Unconscious Seriously, a psychoanalytic account of law 
does not promise mutual understanding or cooperation because all too often such promises 
perpetuate the consolations of fantasy and connive with the forces that obscure and efface our 
limitations. Instead, a Lacanian analysis exposes what is lacking both in the subject and in Law, 
and aims to reveal the obscene core at their centre. Its radical and brutal message is that neither 
Law nor the individual are whole, that the incomplete, failing and miserable organism we grapple 
with on a daily basis is ‘all there is’. For the subject to recognize the fault in the system, including 
the consoling fictions she relies on, is for the subject to come to terms with the non-existence of 
the Big Other, an approach that I term ‘atheist jurisprudence’. 
Far from a benign encounter for mutual understanding, respect and cooperation, the 
encounter between law and psychoanalysis contemplates not only the explosion of the primary 
presuppositions underpinning Law, but also, at its conclusion, the disappearance of psychoanalysis 
from the scene altogether. Psychoanalysis, in other words, is unique amongst discourses because it 
is at ease with its own aphanisis, its own disappearance once its bloody task is complete. Once the 
subject, and the Law, have come to terms with their own castration and encountered their own 
extimate core, psychoanalysis can retreat, making way for the birth of a new subject and, ideally, a 
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